Opinion Evidence - Opinion of Ordinary Witness as to ownership, intent, belief and value of property or services.
The general rule is that a witness must testify to facts and not to opinions or conclusions drawn from the facts. It is the sole province of the court to draw inferences from the facts.[1]
However, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on a question at issue whenever the facts involved are of such a nature that they cannot be described so as to enable persons, who are not eyewitnesses, to form proper conclusions regarding them. The rationale is that there is no way of expressing the results of the witness' observations other than by his conclusions. [2]
An ordinary witness may testify directly to the ownership of property even though ownership is in issue, where the fact of ownership is within his own personal knowledge.[3]
However, title to personal property cannot be determined by relying solely upon an invoice. An invoice is defined as "[a] list of goods sent or services provided, with a statement of the sum due for these.” "An invoice…is not a bill of sale, nor is it evidence of a sale. It is a mere detailed statement of the nature, quantity, or cost of the goods, or price of the things invoiced, and it is as appropriate to a bailment as a sale. Hence, standing alone, it is never regarded as “evidence of title". An invoice cannot be said to be dispositive of ownership. The purpose of the invoice is not to identify the titled owner.[4]
An ordinary witness may testify as to his own intent or belief where it is material. If the doing of an act is not disputed but its validity or effect depends upon the intent with which it was done, the person who did the act may testify as to what his intention was at the time he did the act. [5]
The Court of Appeals has held that: “As a rule, witnesses must state facts, and not draw conclusions, or give opinions. It is the duty of the jury, or court, to draw conclusions from the evidence, and form opinions upon the facts proved. The cases in which opinions of witnesses are allowable, constitute exceptions to the general rule, and the exceptions are not to be extended or enlarged, so as to include new cases, except as a necessity to prevent a failure of justice, and when better evidence cannot be had... On questions of value, a witness must often be permitted to testify to an opinion as to value, but the witness must be shown competent to speak upon the subject. He must have dealt in, or have some knowledge of the article concerning which he speaks. Persons should be conversant with the particular article, and of its value in the market, as a farmer or dealer, or a person conversant with the article, as to the value of lands, cattle, produce, etc. These stand upon the general ground of peculiar skill and judgment in the matters about which opinions are sought. “[6]
Opinion evidence is admissible as to the value of real and personal property and personal services by anyone with a reasonable basis for the opinion. However, a witness must provide a basis of knowledge for his statement of value before it can be accepted as legally sufficient evidence of such value.[7]
There is no rule of law defining how much a witness must know of property before he can be permitted to give an opinion of its value. He must have some acquaintance with it, sufficient to enable him to form some estimate of its value, and then it is for the jury to determine how much weight to attach to such estimate. Where, the witnesses were carpenters and had a general acquaintance with the house; they knew its shape, location, external appearance, and to some extent, its internal condition; and one of them had worked inside of it the Court of Appeals held that the court did not err in allowing their opinions of its value to go the jury for what they were worth.[8]
To establish the inadequacy of the price of land named in the deed, a number of witnesses were called for the plaintiffs, who resided in the neighborhood, of whom inquiry was made as to the value of the land. The witnesses were farmers, and residents of the immediate neighborhood where the land was situated. Some of them were then engaged in mechanical pursuits, but had been engaged in farming at some time in their lives. The value of land in the vicinity is usually understood by all of the residents of a farming neighborhood. The Court of Appeals held that the value of property forms one of the admitted exceptions to the necessity for expert opinion as to value and that the witnesses were competent to give evidence of its value.[9]
Where the witness testimony was to the effect that he was familiar with certain personal property; that he had bought and sold that grade of property, and had for eight years been engaged in the business of keeping a saloon and in buying and selling fixtures and saloons, it was held that he was competent to express his judgment as to the value of the property.[10]
Witnesses who had dealt in sheep, and were acquainted with their varieties and with their market value, were competent to testify to the value of sheep such as those injured. The knowledge of the witnesses was not great, nor their experience wide, but it was enough to make their evidence of value competent.[11]
The value of services is commonly shown by the opinions of qualified witnesses. [12]
Witnesses may give opinions as to the value of services of which they have peculiar knowledge. They may base their opinions upon what they know of the services rendered, or upon a hypothetical case, including some or all the facts proven and the jury will determine from the skill of the witnesses and all the other circumstances the weight to be given to the opinions. Where the plaintiff knows all about the services he rendered and he has some general knowledge of the value of such services, he will be competent to give evidence of its value. Knowing the precise nature of the service rendered, he must have some knowledge of its value, and he is thus competent to give his opinion. It may not be worth much. Its weight, however, is for the jury.[13]
A party himself is competent to testify to the value of his own services.[14]
A party may testify as to his disabilities he suffered as a result of his age and medical condition where the effect of these conditions on his ability to work is readily apparent without the necessity of expert testimony. [15]
[1] Morehouse v. Mathews, 2 N.Y. 514; Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.Y. 187.
[2] Collins v. New York Central Hudson River R.R. Co., 109 N.Y. 243; Fellows v. Inter-borough Rapid Transit Co., 117 misc. 64, 190 N.Y.S. 547.
[3] Pichler v. Reese, 171 N.Y. 577; DeWolf V. Williams, 69 N.Y. 621.
[4] Anonymous v. Anonymous,150 AD3d 91, 51 N.Y.S.3d 66
(1st Dept., 2017) (citing (Sturm v. Boker, 150 US 312, 328 [1893])
[5] McKown v. Hunter, 30 N.Y. 625; Davis v. Marvine, 160 N.Y. 269; Noonan v. Luther, 206 N.Y. 105; People v. Levan, 295 N.Y. 26.
[6] Terpenning v Corn Exch. Ins. Co., 43 N.Y. 279, 281–82 (N.Y. 1871) (citing Nelson, Ch. J., Lincoln v. Schenectady and Saratoga R. R. Co. (23 W. R., 433); Bull v. Flagler (23 Wend., 354); Norman v. Wells (17 Wend., 136); Lamoure v. Caryl (4 Denio, 370). Nelson Ch. J., Lincoln v. Schenectady and Saratoga R. R. Co. (23 W. R., 433); Bull v. Flagler (23 Wend. 354); Norman v. Wells (17 Wend. 136); Lamoure v. Caryl (4 Denio, 370).
[7] People v Lopez, 79 N.Y.2d 402, 404–05 (N.Y. 1992)
[8] Bedell v Long Is. R.R. Co., 44 N.Y. 367, 368–70 (N.Y. 1871) (citing Clark v. Baird, 9 N. Y., 183; Beans v. Capley, 10 N. Y., 93.)
[9] Robertson v Knapp, 35 N.Y. 91, 91–93 (N.Y. 1866)
[10] Hangen v Hachemeister, 114 N.Y. 566, 573 (N.Y. 1889) (citing Hoffman v. Conner (76 N. Y. 121-124).
[11] Holsapple v Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburgh R.R. Co., 86 N.Y. 275, 279 (N.Y. 1881) (citing Teerpenning v. Corn Exch. Ins. Co., 43 N. Y. 279.)
[12] Edgecomb v. Buckhout, 146 N.Y. 332, 40 N.E. 991; Keenan v. Getsinger, 1 App. Div. 172, 37 N.Y.S. 826.
[13] Mercer v Vose, 67 N.Y. 56, 58 (N.Y. 1876)
[14] Mercer v. Vose, 67 N.Y. 56.
[15] In Battinelli v Battinelli, (1991, 1st Dept) 174 App Div 2d 503, 571 NYS2d 280 the court held that general testimony by the wife as to disabilities she suffered as a result of her age and medical condition was properly admitted since the effect of these conditions on the wife's ability to work was readily apparent without the necessity of expert testimony.
The general rule is that a witness must testify to facts and not to opinions or conclusions drawn from the facts. It is the sole province of the court to draw inferences from the facts.[1]
However, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on a question at issue whenever the facts involved are of such a nature that they cannot be described so as to enable persons, who are not eyewitnesses, to form proper conclusions regarding them. The rationale is that there is no way of expressing the results of the witness' observations other than by his conclusions. [2]
An ordinary witness may testify directly to the ownership of property even though ownership is in issue, where the fact of ownership is within his own personal knowledge.[3]
However, title to personal property cannot be determined by relying solely upon an invoice. An invoice is defined as "[a] list of goods sent or services provided, with a statement of the sum due for these.” "An invoice…is not a bill of sale, nor is it evidence of a sale. It is a mere detailed statement of the nature, quantity, or cost of the goods, or price of the things invoiced, and it is as appropriate to a bailment as a sale. Hence, standing alone, it is never regarded as “evidence of title". An invoice cannot be said to be dispositive of ownership. The purpose of the invoice is not to identify the titled owner.[4]
An ordinary witness may testify as to his own intent or belief where it is material. If the doing of an act is not disputed but its validity or effect depends upon the intent with which it was done, the person who did the act may testify as to what his intention was at the time he did the act. [5]
The Court of Appeals has held that: “As a rule, witnesses must state facts, and not draw conclusions, or give opinions. It is the duty of the jury, or court, to draw conclusions from the evidence, and form opinions upon the facts proved. The cases in which opinions of witnesses are allowable, constitute exceptions to the general rule, and the exceptions are not to be extended or enlarged, so as to include new cases, except as a necessity to prevent a failure of justice, and when better evidence cannot be had... On questions of value, a witness must often be permitted to testify to an opinion as to value, but the witness must be shown competent to speak upon the subject. He must have dealt in, or have some knowledge of the article concerning which he speaks. Persons should be conversant with the particular article, and of its value in the market, as a farmer or dealer, or a person conversant with the article, as to the value of lands, cattle, produce, etc. These stand upon the general ground of peculiar skill and judgment in the matters about which opinions are sought. “[6]
Opinion evidence is admissible as to the value of real and personal property and personal services by anyone with a reasonable basis for the opinion. However, a witness must provide a basis of knowledge for his statement of value before it can be accepted as legally sufficient evidence of such value.[7]
There is no rule of law defining how much a witness must know of property before he can be permitted to give an opinion of its value. He must have some acquaintance with it, sufficient to enable him to form some estimate of its value, and then it is for the jury to determine how much weight to attach to such estimate. Where, the witnesses were carpenters and had a general acquaintance with the house; they knew its shape, location, external appearance, and to some extent, its internal condition; and one of them had worked inside of it the Court of Appeals held that the court did not err in allowing their opinions of its value to go the jury for what they were worth.[8]
To establish the inadequacy of the price of land named in the deed, a number of witnesses were called for the plaintiffs, who resided in the neighborhood, of whom inquiry was made as to the value of the land. The witnesses were farmers, and residents of the immediate neighborhood where the land was situated. Some of them were then engaged in mechanical pursuits, but had been engaged in farming at some time in their lives. The value of land in the vicinity is usually understood by all of the residents of a farming neighborhood. The Court of Appeals held that the value of property forms one of the admitted exceptions to the necessity for expert opinion as to value and that the witnesses were competent to give evidence of its value.[9]
Where the witness testimony was to the effect that he was familiar with certain personal property; that he had bought and sold that grade of property, and had for eight years been engaged in the business of keeping a saloon and in buying and selling fixtures and saloons, it was held that he was competent to express his judgment as to the value of the property.[10]
Witnesses who had dealt in sheep, and were acquainted with their varieties and with their market value, were competent to testify to the value of sheep such as those injured. The knowledge of the witnesses was not great, nor their experience wide, but it was enough to make their evidence of value competent.[11]
The value of services is commonly shown by the opinions of qualified witnesses. [12]
Witnesses may give opinions as to the value of services of which they have peculiar knowledge. They may base their opinions upon what they know of the services rendered, or upon a hypothetical case, including some or all the facts proven and the jury will determine from the skill of the witnesses and all the other circumstances the weight to be given to the opinions. Where the plaintiff knows all about the services he rendered and he has some general knowledge of the value of such services, he will be competent to give evidence of its value. Knowing the precise nature of the service rendered, he must have some knowledge of its value, and he is thus competent to give his opinion. It may not be worth much. Its weight, however, is for the jury.[13]
A party himself is competent to testify to the value of his own services.[14]
A party may testify as to his disabilities he suffered as a result of his age and medical condition where the effect of these conditions on his ability to work is readily apparent without the necessity of expert testimony. [15]
[1] Morehouse v. Mathews, 2 N.Y. 514; Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.Y. 187.
[2] Collins v. New York Central Hudson River R.R. Co., 109 N.Y. 243; Fellows v. Inter-borough Rapid Transit Co., 117 misc. 64, 190 N.Y.S. 547.
[3] Pichler v. Reese, 171 N.Y. 577; DeWolf V. Williams, 69 N.Y. 621.
[4] Anonymous v. Anonymous,150 AD3d 91, 51 N.Y.S.3d 66
(1st Dept., 2017) (citing (Sturm v. Boker, 150 US 312, 328 [1893])
[5] McKown v. Hunter, 30 N.Y. 625; Davis v. Marvine, 160 N.Y. 269; Noonan v. Luther, 206 N.Y. 105; People v. Levan, 295 N.Y. 26.
[6] Terpenning v Corn Exch. Ins. Co., 43 N.Y. 279, 281–82 (N.Y. 1871) (citing Nelson, Ch. J., Lincoln v. Schenectady and Saratoga R. R. Co. (23 W. R., 433); Bull v. Flagler (23 Wend., 354); Norman v. Wells (17 Wend., 136); Lamoure v. Caryl (4 Denio, 370). Nelson Ch. J., Lincoln v. Schenectady and Saratoga R. R. Co. (23 W. R., 433); Bull v. Flagler (23 Wend. 354); Norman v. Wells (17 Wend. 136); Lamoure v. Caryl (4 Denio, 370).
[7] People v Lopez, 79 N.Y.2d 402, 404–05 (N.Y. 1992)
[8] Bedell v Long Is. R.R. Co., 44 N.Y. 367, 368–70 (N.Y. 1871) (citing Clark v. Baird, 9 N. Y., 183; Beans v. Capley, 10 N. Y., 93.)
[9] Robertson v Knapp, 35 N.Y. 91, 91–93 (N.Y. 1866)
[10] Hangen v Hachemeister, 114 N.Y. 566, 573 (N.Y. 1889) (citing Hoffman v. Conner (76 N. Y. 121-124).
[11] Holsapple v Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburgh R.R. Co., 86 N.Y. 275, 279 (N.Y. 1881) (citing Teerpenning v. Corn Exch. Ins. Co., 43 N. Y. 279.)
[12] Edgecomb v. Buckhout, 146 N.Y. 332, 40 N.E. 991; Keenan v. Getsinger, 1 App. Div. 172, 37 N.Y.S. 826.
[13] Mercer v Vose, 67 N.Y. 56, 58 (N.Y. 1876)
[14] Mercer v. Vose, 67 N.Y. 56.
[15] In Battinelli v Battinelli, (1991, 1st Dept) 174 App Div 2d 503, 571 NYS2d 280 the court held that general testimony by the wife as to disabilities she suffered as a result of her age and medical condition was properly admitted since the effect of these conditions on the wife's ability to work was readily apparent without the necessity of expert testimony.
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